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Abstract—Online tracking has become a great enabler of
massive surveillance so it is now a critical vector for threatening
the privacy of users. Despite the benefits of online tracking for
personalized advertising, the complexity of the involved platforms
makes it a threat for democracy. In this work, online tracking
is measured in Ecuador, a country with a developing adoption
of online advertising technologies, having the highest Internet
penetration rate in Latin America, but lacking regulation for
privacy. By finding out the third party connections triggered
through the most popular Ecuadorian websites, the concentra-
tion of online tracking is measured in Ecuador. Its impact is
also analyzed by studying some particularities in government
websites, the usage of advanced mechanisms of tracking, and the
adoption of transparency practices in advertising platforms. Our
final aim is exposing potential privacy violations.
Index Terms—online tracking, digital advertising, privacy,
Ecuador, transparency
I. INTRODUCTION
Browsing the Internet becomes more and more a daily
activity such as walking in the street. When walking alone,
people have a natural expectancy of privacy that would make
them refuse, e.g., any obvious attempt to follow them closely.
However, while the same discomfort may arise when “walk-
ing” on the Web, there is very little evidence available for
users to realize the latent pervasiveness of online tracking. In
fact, the opacity and complexity of the Web hide a myriad of
interactions triggered by a single user HTTP request. More-
over, many of such interactions among different actors disclose
granular user information to third parties, which brings serious
concerns regarding the privacy of billions of users. Namely,
the “trail” left when browsing a web page is not only known
by the visited site, but it is also collected by other entities that
“follow” or track users wherever they browse. Said tracking
enables third parties to collect a bunch of user data, which is
used to build profiles that fuel powerful information systems
such as online advertising platforms.
Personalized online advertising is responsible for much of
the online tracking performed over users. Online advertis-
ing platforms are supported by sophisticated personalization
systems that tailor ad content according to the preferences
of users; these preferences are learned from the information
collected by tracking. In this line, the more information
is collected, the better the performance of personalization
systems, and the higher the profits of the advertising platforms.
Since online advertising has become a millionaire business [4]
that, apparently supports the very existence of the Internet [5],
there is a great motivation from multiple instances to collect
more and more data, which implies massifying and improving
online tracking.
With the involvement of so much user information, online
tracking (particularly the one promoted by online advertising)
raises serious privacy concerns. The information collected may
be so varied and detailed (e.g., location, interests, voting pref-
erences) and the technology used so specialized that tracking
may enable third parties to characterize a significant part of a
user’s life. Furthermore, state data is currently being collected,
due to a real-time mechanism that binds online tracking with
every single user web request, enabling third parties (not
only Internet providers) to literally monitor each of the user
“movements” on the Web.
Due to its prevalence on the Web, measuring online tracking
is a great way to characterize the privacy risks of Internet users.
The severity of said risks may be illustrated through different
indicators such as the level of exposition of user interactions
to third parties, the concentration of user information on a
few advertising companies, the dynamic behavior of tracking
for websites belonging to certain categories, or the suspicious
requests to third parties triggered when accessing government
web sites.
While related work [9] has performed more general ap-
proaches by studying online tracking through the most popular
sites of the Web, our analysis focuses on a more reduced
scenario represented by the top sites in Ecuador. Ecuador is
a small South American country where the right to privacy
is guaranteed by its Constitution [6] but where no regulation
is applied. Ironically, radical transparency regulation [8] is
actively enforced to such extent that the privacy of public
employees is put at risk [7]. These dichotomies arise in
developing countries whose perceptions regarding privacy are
not mature, in part, because of the still incipient adoption of








ad and tracking services
Fig. 1. Requests to third parties (3) triggered by a single HTTP user request
(1). When a user browses a webiste, a redirection command is commonly sent
in the HTTP response (2) to spawn further connections to third parties.
By studying online tracking in this context, new findings are
unveiled that are interesting with regard to user privacy risks.
II. BACKGROUND ON ONLINE TRACKING AND
ADVERTISING
A. Online tracking
Online tracking refers to the activity of closely following
a user wherever she ”goes” while browsing the Web. This is
possible because users leave innumerable footprints online,
without even noticing it, when requesting for content to
websites. IP address, operating system, browser type, plugins
installed, patches applied, and browsing history are some
examples of (context) information leaked in a single HTTP
request. If aggregated and processed, said information could
serve to build user profiles revealing location, shopping habits,
entertainment preferences and even the gender of users.
The first potential tracker is thus the website (publisher) that
the user visits. Thus, if tracking is performed from the pub-
lisher, it is called first-party tracking. In general, the audiences
of first parties are pretty segmented, so the user tracking they
might perform is usually innocuous. Some exceptions are the
’walled gardens’ built by the Internet giants (e.g., Facebook),
which concentrate services for millions of users within a single
ecosystem.
Furthermore, a single user web request commonly triggers
connections from the user browser to several third parties
that receive part of the aforementioned contextual information.
This information is used by third-parties to support real-time
services such as personalized advertising or other services
for websites, e.g., media hosting (by content distribution
networks), load balancing, or social networking. Figure 1
illustrates the interactions triggered by a user browser request,
which enable first and third-party tracking.
Undoubtedly, better online services are provided thanks to
personalization and outsourcing; however, third party tracking
supports the massive aggregation of user information (col-
lected along multiple sites along the Web) in the hands of
anyone aiming at paying for it [7]. This inevitably raises
serious concerns regarding the privacy of users, because their
online activity is received and processed by several entities
Fig. 2. Illustration of the multiple connections to third parties (more than
50) generated in the background after visiting only 3 sites. The points where
connections originate represent the websites while the little triangles represent
the third parties contacted. This figure was obtained through the browser
extension Disconnect [10].
Fig. 3. Main components of the online advertising ecosystem.
that users had never heard of. Figure 2 illustrates the large
number of connections to third parties (information flows)
derived when a user visits only three websites.
B. Online advertising
Online advertising consists in displaying ads to users while
they browse the Web. Many of the messages transmitted
through advertising are (or are aimed to be) personalized. Four
main players are involved in this service. First, advertisers
are interested in paying for showing ads to ultimately sell
a product or promote a brand. On the other hand, publish-
ers, mainly websites, produce interesting content that attracts
readers, i.e., potential customers; publishers are willing to
sell ad space in their websites to display advertising material
(ads from advertisers). Ad platforms are groups of entities
that match the demand (from advertisers) and supply (from
publishers) of online services. A marketplace is then built from
ad platforms where ad spaces are automatically auctioned and
delivered to the highest bidder in a fraction of second. Given
the complexity of buying and selling ad inventory under these
conditions (automatically and in real time), publishers and
advertisers trade in online platforms through other specialized
entities: demand-side and supply-side platforms.
Finally, users are the agents whose single request to a
website generates a chain of interactions among the entities
aforementioned, ending, e.g., on a displayed ad. Figure 3 pro-
vides an overview of this ecosystem whose internal operation
is described below.
In brief, this process may be depicted as follows. When
a user browses a website engaged with an ad platform (user
impression), not only an HTTP request is generated to the
website. Through a piece of code sent to the browser in an
HTTP reply, an automatic connection to the ad platform is
triggered from the user’s browser. Said third-party connection
(ad call) requests the ad platform for ads to fill the ad spaces
of the visited site.
Through a mechanism called real-time bidding (RTB), an ad
platform auctions the user impression among the advertisers
interested in displaying ads, awarding the ad space to the
highest bidder. Advertisers bid decision is made based on
user’s metadata sent within the ad call. Personalization is
here enforced by allowing advertisers to tailor their ads to
the interests of users but also to their own strategies. In brief,
ad platforms coordinate the roles of publishers, advertisers and
users to maximize the resulting revenue.
C. Tracking tools for online advertising
Ad personalization requires tons of data about users. Also,
to aggregate collected data on individual profiles, users have to
be singled out during an impression. For this purpose, online
tracking harnesses two main technologies: cookie setting and
fingerprinting. Cookies are strings of text that a web server
puts on the browser of a visiting user. In subsequent visits, the
website retrieves the content of their cookies (usually a user
ID) to recognize the visitor. A fingerprint, instead, is a string
built from static characteristics of the applications and devices
of a user (e.g., IP address, open ports, software versions,
installed plugins). The combination of several of these data
items could be pretty unique.
III. MEASUREMENT METHODOLOGY
In order to measure the extent of online tracking within the
Ecuadorian context, automated visits are measured to the most
popular Ecuadorian websites during December 2018. Upon
each web request information about the requests spawn to third
parties (i.e., to those different from the original destination) is
captured.
This information was further processed to reveal the po-
tential impact of third-party and advertising tracking on user
privacy. This was first done by quantifying the presence of
third-parties behind prominent Ecuadorian publishers. But we
also tried to understand some of the dynamics behind the
relationship between publishers and tracking entities, e.g., by
unveiling the categories of the sites more prone to concentrate
online tracking. Finally, other parameters related to cookie
setting and transparency mechanisms were also processed to
complement our vision of online tracking in Ecuador.
More details on the activities depicted above are given in
the following subsections.
A. Crawling the most popular Ecuadorian websites
Online (third-party) tracking was triggered by generating
first-party connections (HTTP requests) to several Ecuadorian
sites. This implied a single visit to the home page of each
website with no further interactions. For this, we chose the
most popular web pages to increase the probability of finding
online ads that, evidently, motivate most of the tracking
activities. Since generating visits and collecting the derived
data imply a repetitive task for each website, we automatized
these processes using the tool described below.
The list of URLs was extracted from the Alexa top 1
million site list (https://www.alexa.com/), from which 246
Ecuadorian websites were identified whose categories included
news, sports, government, education, etc. For crawling and
data collection, OpenWPM ws used, a very versatile tool
devoted to web measurement [1]. OpenWPM offers a pro-
grammable interface to orchestrate the main functions of a web
browser, thus allowing automated web crawling and collection
of tracking-related information (redirect, cookies and third-
party calls) that is stored in a SQLite database.
Besides collecting third-party-related tracking, popular
Ecuadorian sites were also crawled to examine the adoption of
ads.txt [11], a project promoted by the Internet Advertising
Bureau (IAB) to increase transparency in the programmatic
advertising ecosystem and prevent fraud. It encourages pub-
lishers to publicly inform the companies they have authorized
to sell their advertising inventory (ad spaces). Such publication
is done through a text file (so much like the robots.txt
standard) called ads.txt in the root context of the website.
Interestingly, revealing such information could also serve as
a transparency mechanism for users so we collected and
processed the content of this file to confirm the results obtained
when crawling third-party tracking.
B. Data Processing
To examine the magnitude of online tracking and the latent
risks for privacy, the data obtained through web crawling was
processed and the third-parties contacted (by publishers) and
the cookies set by them were unveiled. The processing of this
information consisted in filtering, aggregating and drawing the
main results derived from an analysis that is divided as follows.
• Counting the (sometimes hundreds of) third-party re-
quests triggered from each visit to popular Ecuadorian
websites. Then, we identified the third parties (e.g., by
domain) where our web requests were redirected. This
was our first approach to measure the prevalence of online
tracking since traffic to third parties commonly involves
the disclosure of information that enables them to track
end users. The degree of presence of these entities gave
us a general idea of the resulting privacy risks.
• Some of the entities and traffic described above were
related to not so intrusive services from the point of view
of privacy (e.g., media hosting or load balancing). Thus,
the same previous procedure was carried out but this
time considering only the third-party tracking activities
associated with online advertising (which is more privacy
aggressive). To identify the advertising-related trackers,
we applied the filtering rules (https://easylist.to/) of Ad-
block Plus, a popular ad blocking browser extension, to
the third-party URLs obtained above. By focusing on
TABLE I
PUBLISHERS THAT GENERATE THE GREATEST NUMBER OF THIRD-PARTY
REQUESTS FROM A SINGLE VISIT.











the online tracking prompted by advertising, we aimed
at having a more realistic perspective of the impact on
privacy.
• Examining the presence of third-party trackers aggregated
by publisher and by publisher category. This approach
gave us some clues to figure out the motivation of ad-
vertisers and online trackers to choose a specific website
from which to track users in the Ecuadorian context.
• Interestingly, we found Ecuadorian government sites
spawning web requests to known advertising and social
media platforms. Thus, the analysis was focused on these
websites to further research on the reason why these
institutions were facilitating such third-party traffic.
• Finally, the cookies set by third-parties were analyzed
to determine whether the corresponding strings could be
considered as identifiers in the process of tracking users.
IV. RESULTS
A. Third-party tracking
Following the methodology described in Section III, we
registered hundreds of third party requests as a result of a
single interaction with Ecuadorian websites. Some of these
requests are due to outsourced services that websites contract,
e.g.,for content distribution or load balancing. In any case, this
implies a significant flow of information directly derived from
user web requests. Thus, it is very likely that user information
is being disclosed.
Beyond the privacy concerns raised by the leakage of
personal information, the additional traffic towards entities
different from the publisher may entail significant monetary
costs, especially for users of mobile devices. This is a major
issue when it was found that a single web request is followed
by 57 additional requests on average, which is a huge amount
of traffic not explicitly generated by the user.
In Table I, the publishers responsible for the greatest number
of third-party requests have been outlined. According to the
figure, sports and news websites are the ones generating the
largest amount of traffic to third parties.
Many of these third-party requests could have the same
destination, so it is convenient to identify the recipient entities
(third-party trackers) by filtering the domain names from
their destination URLs. As noted above, insofar these entities
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Fig. 4. Percentage of third parties associated with Ecuadorian publishers.
Here the 15 websites with the greatest amount of third-parties are depicted.
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Fig. 5. Percentage of ad-related third parties associated with Ecuadorian
publishers (with respect to the total amount of third parties found). 15 websites
are depicted that contact the greatest quantity of third-parties.
receive so much indirect user traffic, they might become
privacy attackers.
We found a grand total of 539 third-party entities
present along Ecuadorian publishers, distributed in differ-
ent proportions. Figure 4 depicts the 15 publishers that
spawned most third-party traffic during our experiments. A
sports site (studio futbol.com.ec) and a news site
(ecuadorinmediato.com) redirect traffic to more than
20% of all the third party entities found in Ecuador. In fact,
most of the publishers in the figure are again related to sports
(particularly soccer), news and media. Although these findings
could give us some intuition with regard to the concentration
of online tracking, in the next section, where only the tracking
due to advertising is considered, this is further analyzed.
B. Ad-related tracking
The tracking supporting online advertising is by far more
intrusive in terms of privacy because it explicitly enables
the collection of user data for personalization. As described
in Section III, to measure such tracking, we filtered the
destination URLs from our data set using the Easy list blocking
rules. These rules are commonly used by popular web browser
extensions to identify and block ad-related traffic. 147 entities

























































































Fig. 6. Categories of Ecuadorian publishers where ad-related traffic is
originated.
In Figure 5, the prevalence of ad-based trackers in publishers
is plotted. The percentage of trackers in websites is evidently
lower but the distribution looks very similar to that of Figure
4. Once again, sites categorized as News/Media are among the
publishers more tracked by advertising entities. In general, this
(including a few sports) sites are the preferred by advertisers
that certainly look for wide audiences. Thus, the inherent
tracking in such kind of publishers also grows.
To better understand how ad tracking is deployed along
publishers, we categorized each of them and then aggregated
the ad-related trackers according to such categories. This is
shown in Figure 6. Around 20% of the ad tracking entities
from our data set are present in News/Media sites. This means
that several websites belonging to this category are engaged
with ad-related tracking.
Interestingly enough, there was another category group-
ing several Ecuadorian sites, Government/Legal, where
advertising-related tracking was prevalent. A lot of government
websites ere found that were triggering third-party requests to
advertising platforms. Although the volume of third parties
contacted was small, compared with News/Media, the amount
of publishers involved was quite significant as depicted in
Figure 6. This is further analyzed in the next subsection.
In general, categories shown in Figure 6 suggest, as ex-
pected, that ad-related online tracking is tightly related to pub-
lishers that offer mass consumption content (e.g., newspapers)
and sales channels (e-commerce).
Finally, when aggregating the publishers of our data set
according to the ad platform contacted, a remarkable concen-
tration on Google-owned domains was fount that exacerbates
user privacy risks. As shown in Figure 7, at least seven do-
mains associated with this company were receiving redirected
tracking traffic from a lot of Ecuadorian publishers. In fact,
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Fig. 7. Prevalence of ad-related tracking entities along the publishers exam-
ined. Google-owned domains (particularly doubleclick.net) appear on
more than 50% of the publishers tested.
doubleclick.net collects requests from more than 50%
of the publishers at hand.
C. Ad-related tracking on government websites
The presence of ad tracking in government sites was quite
weird since they did not embed commercial advertising.
In this regard, such third-party traffic was generated by a
WordPress plugin installed by default. WordPress is a content
management system, widely used by Ecuadorian websites,
which simplifies the deployment of web pages but comes
with a lot of modules activated by default, increasing the
risk of security bugs. Through a new crawling, we found
that 55.9% of government websites were developed on a
WordPress template.
D. Specific privacy leaks
With the aim of identifying particular privacy leaks, we
looked for mouse tracking entities. Currently, there are a
lot of companies offering mouse analytics to capture the
user experience with a website. However, privacy issues arise
from the sensitive information that could be inferred from
such biometrics [2]. The data collected was filtered by some
keywords related to mouse tracking and found only 4 of such
entities and 17 publishers using their services. hotjar.com
was the most used (by 13 publishers).
Being cookies one of the pillars of online tracking, we were
also interested in understanding their usage as user identifiers.
Our approach was cataloging as an identifier each string that
was more than six characters long. Thus, we found that 66% of
the cookies set by third parties could have been considered as
identifiers. Furthermore, unsurprisingly, hundreds of cookies
had been set in at least 10 of the most popular Ecuadorian
websites as depicted in Table II.
E. ads.txt as an ad transparency mechanism
Inspired by the work in [3], we examined the adoption of
the ads.txt standard in the Ecuadorian context. For this,
the selected publishers were crawled and, if available, the
ads.txt file was collected and processed.
TABLE II
NUMBER OF COOKIES SET BY THIRD-PARTY TRAFFIC SPAWNED BY
POPULAR ECUADORIAN WEBSITES.












Around 15% of the popular publishers analyzed had
adopted this transparency mechanism, even though Google had
strongly encouraged its implementation at that time. This just
revealed a still immature advertising market in this country.
When processing these ads.txt files, we found that four
sites had more than 500 records authorizing to sell their ad
spaces to several third-parties. This evidently implies a very
high willingness to interact with ad platforms, with the privacy
risks that it entails. Trough this analysis, we corroborated
our finding that Google offered by far the most prevalent
advertising platform.
V. CONCLUSIONS
To fuel digital advertising’s automatic processes, online
tracking enables the collection of several personal data items,
e.g., IP addresses, location, timestamps, browsing history,
language, etc. Through identification and external information,
such items may significantly facilitate the work of third parties
to unveil sensitive attributes about individuals. Online tracking
in the Ecuadorian context is concentrated on a few popular
News/Media publishers, mainly due to an underdeveloped
online advertising market. This issue is evidenced by the
lack of interest of publishers in adopting advertising industry
standards such as ads.txt and the scarce presence of
more specific tracking technologies such as mouse analytics.
Anyhow, online tracking is still pervasive in this country: a
large number of third parties are indirectly contacted by users,
and a lot of tracking cookies set on the user side after a
single web request. Such pervasiveness, mainly encouraged by
advertising, the disclosure of granular user information and
the need to meet real-time requirements, raise more privacy
risks [12], [13]. Moreover, when ads are displayed, a few
thousands of third parties receive metadata about millions
of users for free, implying the establishment of a massive
surveillance ecosystem [14]. Sadly, in a country as small
as Ecuador, a thinner margin for anonymity is left. As this
were not enough, Google, might be collecting user-related
information from more than 60% of the publishers analyzed
here. This privacy risk is exacerbated by operational issues of
Ecuadorian websites, which might be provoking the leakage
of user information (jeopardizing privacy) even when they are
not engaged with advertising platforms.
Sadly, unlike many other countries, Ecuador does not have
laws for privacy protection, so covering the specific concerns
raised by online tracking and advertising, it seems, will remain
a pending matter for long time. Future work in this context
might involve, e.g., measuring the Ecuadorian user perception
regarding this tracking behind the scenes, studying publishers’
privacy policies towards advertising and third-party tracking,
and even perform a comparative study of the situation at
different countries.
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“On the regulation of personal data distribution in online advertising
platforms”, Engineering Applications of Artificial Intelligence, vol. 82,
pp. 13-29, 2019.
